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Закінчення статті «ONCE AGAIN ABOUT THE NEW CONSTITUTION», с. 3
ONCE AGAIN ABOUT THE NEW CONSTITUTION
Слово Просвіти, №15 за 2011 рік
Conclusion. Beginning on page 3. as one of the links of the so-called “presidential power vertical.” There has not been such a disenfranchised and humiliated government in all the years of independence. In Ukraine, the institution of independent constitutional justice has been effectively liquidated. The Constitutional Court is incapable of resisting the unconstitutional whims of the ruling regime. Its purpose has been reduced, in essence, to the public voicing of decisions handed down from the Presidential Administration. The artificially fragmented judicial system with the degraded role of the Supreme Court in it has turned the judiciary from a formally independent branch of state power into an obedient instrument of the President and the Party of Regions. In such conditions, it is not worth talking even about a minimally effective system of checks and balances between the bodies of different branches of power. These examples are already enough to note the excessive concentration of powers in the hands of the “dominant player” — President V. Yanukovych. At the same time, it must be emphasized that the establishment of the current political regime, in particular the new role of the President of Ukraine, was ensured in an unconstitutional way. First, a parliamentary coalition was created in violation of the norms of the Constitution — the so-called “coalition of carcasses,” which formed the Cabinet of Ministers. Then the Constitutional Court was hastily reformatted, which illegally changed the Constitution with its non-legal decision. Ukraine returned to the 1996 model of the Constitution. A transition to a presidential-parliamentary form of government took place, and President V. Yanukovych reshuffled the “coalition of carcasses” government. Recently, the Verkhovna Rada illegally granted the President of Ukraine additional powers, in particular in the sphere of personnel policy, which no longer fit into the constitutional field in any way. In conditions of a low level of social support for the “dominant player,” the low legitimacy of the ruling regime has become its Achilles’ heel. In such a situation, it is precisely through a new Constitution that it is easiest to “legitimize” this political regime and its main dominant — President V. Yanukovych. The new Constitution will be drafted in such a way that the current unconstitutional provisions of many newly adopted laws will turn into constitutional norms. The apologists of the Constitutional Assembly want to solve the problem of the illegitimacy of the existing regime by sacrificing the current Constitution to unconstitutional laws. All the previous activities of the leaders of the new government, which were based on the ideology of “concepts,” must be embodied in constitutional matter. An effective political technology for building a political regime with a “dominant player” is the uncertainty regarding the number of possible terms of office for the incumbent President. The appearance of a new Constitution, given the practice of the Constitutional Court during the time of President L. Kuchma, will create “legal grounds” for V. Yanukovych to be elected to the post of President of Ukraine three or four times in a row. And for now, such uncertainty is an effective instrument for expanding the President’s influence and pressure on political partners and business. Uncertainty always worries and frightens. The desire to create constitutional grounds for a third term of V. Yanukovych’s powers is, undoubtedly, a separate self-sufficient interest of the apologists of the new Constitution. Therefore, the new Constitution must ensure the legitimization of the new regime, creating the impression of a simple change in the form of government. The new government realizes that it is using powers obtained in an unconstitutional way. In addition, to the fanfares about changing the form of organization of power, the state will actually be refounded, which will deprive Ukrainians of their national statehood. The national rights of Ukrainians, in particular the right to their own state, will be liquidated or maximally curtailed. Although the maximum concentration of power in the hands of the President will take place in the near future within the framework of a presidential-parliamentary republic, the question of the final form of the political regime remains open. A political regime with a “dominant player” within the framework of a presidential-parliamentary form of government may turn out to be only an intermediate form. The departure from the pluralistic competitive way of organizing power, which is observed now, paves the way for the birth of an autocratic regime. However, it should not be excluded that for the Ukrainophobic oligarchy and the Kremlin, the concentration of power in the hands of the President is needed only as a temporary phenomenon in order to carry out an anti-Ukrainian and anti-democratic revenge, refound the state, and take revenge on the opposition. Having solved the current tasks related to the policy of revenge, the refounding of the state, and the complete redistribution of property in Ukraine, including agricultural lands, the new government may subsequently resort to another somersault backward — in the direction of a parliamentary-presidential form of government, to an oligarchic parliamentary republic, oligarchic parliamentarism. Such a sharp turn may turn out to be necessary for the oligarchy in order to avoid personal responsibility for the state of affairs in the state and to remain in power for as long as possible. In 2008, when the Party of Regions and the BYuT “got married” on the basis of the idea of a new Constitution, exactly such a scenario was envisaged. However, neither a political regime with a “dominant player,” nor an autocratic regime, nor so-called “oligarchic parliamentarism” corresponds to the ideals of national democracy. Ukraine must not deviate from the path of European democracy. * * * The third potential threat, which will be generated by the new Constitution and the activities of the Constitutional Assembly as a constituent body, consists in the possible limitation of citizens’ rights, in particular their social rights. Without a high public rating, it will be extremely difficult for President V. Yanukovych to remain in the role of a “dominant player” for long. Therefore, he will have to compensate for the low social support for the regime by strengthening authoritarian tendencies. And this will require limiting not only in practice, but also at the constitutional level, both the national and social rights of Ukrainians. Only a new Constitution will allow rewriting the rights and freedoms of citizens under the ideology of the new political regime. Already now, a sharp narrowing of the social rights of citizens is observed, for example, to education, medicine, labor, housing, pension provision, etc. The volume of social rights of citizens declared in the current Constitution hinders the pro-government oligarchic clans from realizing their desire for boundless enrichment. It is easier to control disenfranchised people and keep them in submission. It is precisely in the potential narrowing of the constitutional rights of citizens in the social sphere that the third threat of the constitutional reform initiated by President V. Yanukovych lies. * * * The idea of adopting a new Constitution carries within itself yet another, fourth, threat — the threat of blackening the Constitution and discrediting Ukrainian constitutionalism in general. And therefore, Ukrainian statehood as well. But this is already the subject of the next commentary. Ivan ZAIETS Collage by Oles Dmytrenko
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