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THE WISER ONE WILL OFFER THE HAND FIRST...
Слово Просвіти, №20 за 2005 рік
Last Thursday, May 12, 2005, an event took place that, without exaggeration, shook all of Ukraine: President Yushchenko spoke with the entire nation. The case is unprecedented and, in its own way, symbolic: in the 14 years of Independence, and in all of history, nothing like it had happened. For two hours, live on three nationwide television channels, this far from simple conversation went on. Thousands upon thousands of people of different political orientations, supporters and opponents alike, took part in it. Questions came in by telephone and through the Internet. Each question was allotted 20 seconds, and every 5 seconds 10 calls came in. The STB studio alone, when it finished taking calls, reported that 26 thousand viewers had called during the two hours of air time, while the Novyi Kanal recorded that more than 4 thousand questions had arrived via the Internet. However, the uniqueness of this event lies not only in its mass reach (for comparison, the pre-election television debates aroused no less mass interest), but also in several distinctly expressed features. They consist of the following:
First, it was truly a two-way conversation, a kind of collective interview on a free topic, where every citizen could ask, and did ask, any question of the country's President.
Second, it was an event that demonstrated the democratic character, openness and accessibility of the new government, its concrete steps toward the people.
Third, it was an entirely new style of communication between the leader of the nation and the masses, initiated by the revolutionary Maidan: even the "nightingale" Kravchuk, not to mention the tongue-tied Kuchma, did not dare to face such a mass of people alone and speak off the cuff.
Fourth, this multichannel live broadcast demonstrated the high moral qualities, professional knowledge, erudition and, finally, the ordinary courage of Viktor Yushchenko, who came out to the people and, with complete frankness, without hiding behind convoluted phrases, answered the most pointed questions. And those questions were not always pleasant; rather, they were sharp and problematic, long-festering, and at times openly hostile. People were interested in everything: social policy, personnel failures, rising prices, the recent celebration of the 60th anniversary of victory in the Second World War (which, for many, still remains the "Patriotic War" according to Communist-Soviet ideological stereotypes), the economy and taxes, the squandering of land and accession to NATO, orientation toward Russia or toward Europe, and much more.
Yet let us single out three most important problems of national significance, which are now the most painful points of the social organism:
1) language policy and the attempts of certain political forces to give official (read: state) status to the Russian language;
2) the clamor of the "new opposition" about allegedly political repressions unleashed by the authorities in Ukraine;
3) the reconciliation of veterans of the past war who fought in the ranks of the Soviet Army with the soldiers of the OUN-UPA.
The most sharp, radical and hostile questions poured in on these extremely acute topics; from the squares and streets came shouts of "Yushchenko, out!" and "Yushchenko, yes!" And this is Ukraine.
That the language question has been placed first does not at all mean an underestimation of the economic, social or domestic political problems. It only means that the problem of the Ukrainian language was pushed to the background throughout all 14 years of Independence: supposedly, the main issues are socio-economic, while language matters are secondary. Moreover, with every presidential or parliamentary election the language card was played, and a speculative flirtation with the so-called Russian-speaking population was conducted. Let us recall: already during Kuchma's first term he promised to grant Russian the status of a second state language. And Yushchenko's rival in the last race revived this speculative idea. Even now, in the Verkhovna Rada, on the eve of the 2006 parliamentary elections, this worn-out card is being pulled out again in the form of a good dozen different "language" bills.
Such a clumsy and, for the titular nation, hostile policy has, unfortunately, led to negative consequences: the Russification of the population has reached total proportions.
Why is the question of the national language cornerstone in a national state? Because language is the main sign of a nation. It is not only a means of communication; it is the genetic code of a community's development, the psychology of the nation, its science and culture; in it is compressed the historical experience of many generations. Where there is a language, there is a nation; where there is no language, there is no nation. That is why every conqueror has tried to destroy the language of a subjugated people, for language is precisely the consolidating factor in organizing resistance. It is here that the roots lie of Polonization, Romanization, Magyarization, and above all Russification, which our people experienced at various stages of its history.
Continued on p. 6
Pp. 8–9
Government on direct line
P. 3
Extreme Tourism
P. 11
с. 6 · сторінка оригіналу ↗
VIEW. Continued. Beginning on p. 1. That is why states such as France, Poland, and others, whose languages are not directly threatened by anything or anyone, have taken care of the legislative protection of their national languages. Russia, however, has developed a concept for strengthening and asserting the Russian language not only within the territory of the Federation but also in the CIS countries in general. In our country, there are wiseacres who shamelessly put forward a senseless and far-fetched problem — granting the Russian language the status of a state language. Practically, this means a requiem for the language of the titular nation. The clamor about some allegedly linguistic oppression of the “Russian-speaking population” does not withstand any criticism: no oppression exists. On the contrary, a real threat has emerged to the language of the indigenous population, the titular nation, due to aggressive Russification. Linguistic questions are quite complex for Yushchenko: Ukrainians rightfully demand the protection of the national language, while the “Russian-speakers,” who, unfortunately, are not few, unjustly want the status of a second state language for Russian. And this is Ukraine. The President correctly emphasized: we live in a Ukrainian state, where the state language, according to the Constitution, is Ukrainian. But he immediately made a HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. The harshest and most impudent offensive against the Ukrainian language took place in the cities of southern Ukraine, where Russification was much deeper and more destructive. Here is how the process of Ukrainization of higher education institutions took place in the former Odesa Governorate. At a time when, on average across Ukraine among the townspeople, Ukrainians made up 47%, Russians 25%, and Jews 22%, in Odesa, as the modern Ukrainian historian Petro Sobol asserts, there were very few Ukrainians — 4%, while Russians, who accounted for 45.6%, and Jews — 44% predominated. It was from them that the main staff of lecturers and students in Odesa was formed. In the 1922–23 academic year, in the Odesa Governorate, there were only 4% of Ukrainian vocational education institutions, although the percentage of students of Ukrainian nationality was 22.2%. Thus, it is already clear from this that there was favorable ethnic soil here for resistance to Ukrainization. The introduction of the Ukrainian language in higher education institutions depended on how well the teaching staff possessed the Ukrainian language. This matter was resolved better in those cities of the south where the national composition contributed to this. Thus, in the Kherson district, where 75% of Ukrainians lived, as of October 1, 1924, there were 60% of educators who were well-versed in the Ukrainian language. And in Mykolaiv, the situation was completely the opposite: at the Mykolaiv Institute of People's Education at the beginning of the 1923–24 academic year, only two lecturers taught in Ukrainian. One taught Ukrainian language and literature, the other — Ukrainian language and history of Ukraine. The management of the higher education institution was engaged in formal administration, repeatedly making decisions about the necessity of fluent command of the native language by applicants and graduates. Periodically, orders were issued prohibiting the issuance of certificates of graduation from the institute to graduates without knowledge of Ukrainian. A curtsy toward the Russian-speaking population: they say, both sides must maintain tolerance and mutual understanding, “there is no need to mutually exclude demands.” But why, actually? Why should the titular nation reconcile itself to the degradation of its native language and not exclude the unlawful demands of one, albeit the most numerous, minority? There are also millions of Ukrainians in Russia, but how would the Russians react if they began to demand state status for their language? Or if at least one deputy spoke in the Russian parliament in Ukrainian? Unfortunately, our President, contrary to his Ukrainian soul, about which there is no doubt, has fallen under the influence of his entourage and is ready to compromise on a fundamental national issue where there can be no room for compromises. Otherwise, how can one explain that it was from the depths of the presidential entourage that a draft decree emerged on the mandatory requirement for officials to know the Russian language? They already know it, unlike Ukrainian, which even some ministers (of the new government!) do not possess. Otherwise, how can one explain that, commenting on the language problem on live air, the President again yields to “Russian-speakingness” at the expense of the national, emphasizing that “we will be against the introduction of any benefits for Ukrainian-language publishing houses. We proceed from the fact that fiscal policy, taxes are equal for everyone, and state support must be clearly declared in the budget”?! The contradiction here is obvious: clearly — against benefits for Ukrainian-language literature and vaguely-generally — about its budgetary support. Support is not a handout, but the creation of priority conditions for the development of the national language in a national state, including tax breaks. Like in France, Poland, in that same Russia... It is high time for our authorities to grasp this. On issues regarding the clamor of the “new opposition” about repressions, Yushchenko is much clearer, firmer, and more consistent: “I think that crooks and bandits have nothing to do in politics. You cannot build your policy on lies, on robberies, on billions of lost funds; for me, believe me, this is not an opposition.” And he cites simply devastating facts: last year, 4 billion UAH were stolen from the budget from value-added tax refunds; 2 billion UAH were stolen on the railways — by a telephone command, they were transferred to the election campaign of the pro-government candidate; 1 billion was pilfered through the State Management of Affairs (DUSia); one and a half million went last year just for bouquets that the President of Ukraine gave; 100 million were stolen under the guise of encouraging Olympians; 300 thousand dry rations were taken from military warehouses to feed Yanukovych's supporters... The facts are striking: what repressions can one talk about? One can and must talk about the inevitability of punishment for committed crimes if we want to build a state based on the rule of law. Therefore, the figures are perceived with understanding: in 1.5 months, 19,262 crimes were uncovered, every 3rd crime is either a bribe or abuse of power; among the criminals, unfortunately, are the heads of regional state administrations, departments, and divisions of state structures, and others. On issues of reconciliation of veterans, Viktor Yushchenko was at his best. He was the first among the leaders of the nation to publicly raise this burning issue. Both the soldiers of the Soviet Army and the warriors of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, although they fought in different detachments, fought for the freedom of a single Ukrainian
«Слово Просвіти», CC BY 4.0; machine translation from Ukrainian by Prosvita.Digital · PDF у Вікісховищі ↗ · Машинний переклад
