Емблема «Просвіта»ПРОСВІТАЦИФРОВАЗнання · Люди · Майбутнє

“IN UKRAINE” OR “ON UKRAINE”?

Слово Просвіти, №45 за 2010 рік

“Language conflicts: artificial or real” (expert of the National Institute for International Security Problems under the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, Doctor of Philological Sciences Halyna YAVORSKA). A communicative language conflict arises on the basis of the fact of the existence of different languages. The mechanism of this conflict is described in the Book of Judges, 12 (the people of Gilead, in order to identify the enemy Ephraimites, forced them to pronounce the word “shibboleth”, and they pronounced “sibboleth”, because they could not do otherwise. “And they would seize him and slaughter him at the fords of the Jordan. And at that time forty-two thousand of Ephraim fell”). In known language conflicts, as a rule, all three components are named: political (struggle and power domination of the community), communicative, and symbolic (connected with identities). The language issue in Ukraine became one of the key elements of political struggle from the very first years of Ukraine’s independence. Throughout the entire existence of the modern Ukrainian state, the majority of political forces have been trying to play the “language card”. The playing occurs in one direction — politicians appeal to the interests of the Russian-speaking population, which is not accidental. There are two reasons for this state of affairs: 1) the peculiarities of the language situation in Ukraine — the presence of asymmetric bilingualism (those who speak Ukrainian are proficient in Russian, and not the other way around); 2) the insufficient effectiveness of the official language policy, which ignored the realities of the language situation in Ukraine, trying, in particular, to bypass the fact of the presence of bilingualism and multilingualism in Ukraine. The issue of the status and functioning of regional and minority languages was not regulated, which caused a corresponding reaction (in particular, the Yefremov—Hrynevetskyi—Symonenko bill). The conflict-generating potential of the language problem in Ukraine is high. This is evidenced, in particular, by the materials of the language polemic, which regularly contains unparliamentary expressions and barely concealed threats towards opponents. One cannot ignore the numerous internet forums on which the language issue is discussed. Hardly any other topic evokes so many openly xenophobic expressions and calls directed at violence against representatives of other ethnic and language communities. To consider all this merely as manifestations of intolerance by marginals would be too shortsighted. The position in the language polemic and even the choice of the language of communication in this aggravated situation become a sign of division into “one’s own” and “strangers”. One of the general theses accompanying the language discussion is the thesis about the far-fetched nature of the language issue. According to the data of individual polls, journalists refuse to acknowledge the existence of a language problem, while at the same time believing that it carries a threat to Ukraine. Indicative is the attitude toward the language problem as a phantom — it is enough to stop paying attention to it and stop talking about it, and the problem will disappear by itself. New language bills proposed in recent years are aimed at overcoming the discrepancy between the “Law on Languages” of the Ukrainian SSR of 1989 and the new socio-political and linguistic reality. The recent Yefremov—Hrynevetskyi—Symonenko project received the most publicity. The main flaws of this project are: 1) the lack of provision of language rights for representatives of all language groups (except Russian), including the rights of Ukrainian-speaking citizens and representatives of other language communities; 2) the use of the Russian language in official spheres, education, etc., is provided for throughout the entire territory of Ukraine, contrary to the regional status of the Russian language; 3) the bill radically changes the principles of language education that have formed over the last 20 years, instead of flexibly adjusting these principles where there is a need; 4) contrary to the principles of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, the project narrows the sphere of functioning of the state language; “In Ukraine” or “on Ukraine” — how should one speak? And just as one should live — if in a full-fledged state — then “in Ukraine”, if on a territory (read — of a foreign state) — then “on Ukraine”. Today we still have a choice. Tomorrow it may not be there. After all, if one is to believe the latest sociological studies, more than 54% of Ukrainian citizens believe that the language issue “does not exist”. Meanwhile, against the backdrop of such astonishing carelessness, the interference of a neighboring country in the internal affairs of Ukraine is becoming 5) the project completely rejects the regulation of the use of languages in the sphere of advertising, private entrepreneurship, etc., which does not correspond to international practice; 6) the project does not provide guarantees of support for other regional and minority languages in Ukraine, except for Russian. In particular, endangered languages such as Krymchak and Karaim are not mentioned even in the general list of languages; 7) the project does not provide for any instruments of financial support for the implementation of the new language policy, which must be very significant (training of specialists, the cost of reform in the sphere of education, etc.). In the event of the adoption of the bill, the threat of further displacement of regional and minority languages is intensified. Instead of supporting language diversity, language unification is supported. The goals declared in the project are acceptable, however, the content and direction of the proposed language policy do not correspond to the proclaimed goals. The project is capable of causing public resistance due to its actual focus on ensuring the rights only of Russian-speaking citizens. Instead of a general conclusion, I will cite the words of Mykhailyna Hrushko: “The language issue is one of the most painful — one must look at this soberly, with eyes wide open, speaking frankly about false perceptions and stereotypes and not trying to neglect ‘fictions’ and ‘artificially fanned fires’. After all, fire from a lightning strike and fire from a cigarette butt are equally capable of destroying a forest.” “Dynamics of Language Changes in Post-Soviet Kyiv” (Professor of the Department of Ukrainian Language at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Doctor of Philological Sciences Larysa MASENKO). The study of the processes taking place in the linguistic and cultural life of the capital is of particular interest, because they determine the future vector of the development of the language situation in the entire country. Unfortunately, during the years of independence, a detailed sociolinguistic study of Kyiv was successfully conducted only once — in 2000, thanks to the initiative of Hanna Zalizniak, who at that time headed the “Public Opinion” Center for Sociological Research of the Research Institute of Socio-Economic Problems of Kyiv. However, the dynamics of changes in the language situation in Kyiv can be traced through some all-Ukrainian studies. Important statistical data are contained, for example, in the monograph by Kharkiv ethnologist Volodymyr Skliar “Ethnolinguistic Processes in the Ukrainian Space: 1989—2001” (Kharkiv, 2009), in which a comparative analysis of the results of the 1989 and 2001 censuses was conducted according to many parameters. The mentioned study confirms that during these years, the ratio of two groups of the population — Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking — according to the “native language” indicator underwent the greatest changes precisely in the capital. The number of Kyivans who consider Ukrainian their native language increased in 2001 compared to 1989 by almost 25% (24.9%). At the same time, the number of those who considered Russian their native language decreased in the capital by 38.6%. Interesting data regarding the language situation in Kyiv are also provided by sociologist Iryna Prybyt kova in the final analysis (2001) of studies by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. It is known that large cities in Ukraine are the most Russified, but, as I. Prybyt kova notes, Kyivans show significant differences in national-linguistic identification compared to residents of other cities. Here, a significantly higher percentage of people who recognize Ukrainian as their native language is observed than on average in large cities (62.2%). Although by the criterion of “language of communication in the family,” the indicator of Ukrainian-speaking communication approaches the average for large cities (15.6%), the indicator of Russian-speaking communication in the family is significantly lower than the average (30.0%), while the group of bilinguals doubles compared to other cities. In general, in Kyiv, as I. Prybyt kova notes, bilingualism in family communication is the most widespread: here, both languages are used 2.2 times more often than in large cities, and 1.8 times more often than in small ones. It should be said that the indicators of my study with Hanna Zalizniak, which concerned the answers of Kyivans to the question about the language of everyday communication, coincided with the indicators provided by I. Prybyt kova about the language of family communication only in the part of using the Ukrainian language (14.8%). As for the ratio of using the Russian language and using both languages equally, it was 52.5% to 32.0%, respectively. This indicates that in the family communication of Kyivans, according to 2001 data, bilingualism was more widespread than in non-family communication, where the Russian language prevails. However, a survey conducted by the Center for Sociological Research under the leadership of H. Zalizniak in 2004 revealed a tendency towards an increase in the number of bilinguals according to the “language of everyday communication” indicator: the number of those who use either Ukrainian or Russian in everyday life increased compared to 2000 by 10% — from 32% to 42%. The quantitative growth of bilinguals in Kyiv due to the decrease in the predominant use of the Russian language signaled the beginning of a process of language shift — a transition from Russian-speaking communication to Ukrainian-speaking. These changes were also confirmed by a number of other indicators of the 2000 study. For example, 70% of Kyivans considered a good knowledge of the Ukrainian language necessary, while significantly fewer residents of the capital spoke out for the necessity of a good knowledge of Russian (42%). But this positive vector of the development of the language situation in the capital, as in Ukraine as a whole, had to be supported by state language policy. And if the first two presidents — L. Kravchuk and L. Kuchma, as former Soviet functionaries, obviously did not attach importance to this task, then from V. Yushchenko, who was brought to power by a powerful all-Ukrainian movement for national and social freedom, all conscious Ukrainians expected a policy of protecting national interests, which in the linguistic sphere involved the creation of a special body endowed with functions of control over the implementation of language legislation, in particular the implementation of Article 10 of the Constitution of Ukraine, as well as the formation of a national information and cultural space, protecting it from Russian expansion, supporting Ukrainian culture, etc. After all, during the Orange Revolution, the Ukrainian people showed their strength and solidarity, the ability to overcome the inertia of the Soviet era, which does not allow the country to move forward. To our misfortune, the astonishing helplessness of V. Yushchenko in the high position entrusted to him by the Ukrainian community led to the current loss of the achievements of the Orange Revolution and the coming to power of that anti-Ukrainian minority against which the Maidan rose up in the autumn of 2004. The current leadership wants to return the country to the Soviet past. But hardly

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