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Post-genocidal Ukraine without makeup and embellishments
Слово Просвіти, №47 за 2012 рік
Ukrainians have long needed to stop arguing with the descendants of KGB agents, career Komsomol members, and communists about whether the Holodomor of 1933 was a genocide or not. If we do not want to lose our own statehood, we must fight the consequences of our national tragedy, without overcoming which Ukraine will continue to remain, by all socio-economic indicators, among the countries of Central America or equatorial Africa and a laughingstock for all of Europe, including even Eurasian Russia. Iryna MAHRYTSKA, Luhansk
The Kremlin executioners of 1933 achieved their goal. Today, Ukrainians have major problems with European mentality and identity. But before the Holodomor, Ukrainian peasants, in their worldview, practically did not differ from the Polish peasants or French farmers of that time. With such traits, they would never have become exemplary collective farmers, without which the final victory of socialism in the USSR would have been impossible. To confirm this thought, I am forced once again (!) to cite a quote from the Sixtier Vasyl Ovsienko: “Ukrainians as an ethnos, with their deep religiosity, individualism, private ownership, and attachment to their land, were not suitable for building communism — and Soviet high-ranking officials pointed this out. Ukraine must be wiped off the face of the earth, and the remnants of the Ukrainian people must become material for a ‘new historical community’ — the Soviet people, the basis of which would be the Russian population, language, and culture. To enter communism as a Ukrainian as such was impossible in principle.” Here is also an opinion on this matter from the last Russian intellectual, Andrei Sakharov: “The great country was under communist control. The majority of its population was hostile to the system. Representatives of national culture and even a significant part of the communists accepted Moscow’s rule only conditionally. From the party’s point of view, this was bad not only in itself but also harbored a great danger for the regime in the future.” That is, it can be argued that Ukraine, which was occupied by Bolshevik Russia territorially and administratively, remained unconquered spiritually and mentally. Why the communist regime chose specifically an artificial famine is also clear. Because this criminal execution not only destroyed the personality of the starving, it allowed their European mentality, so hated by the Bolshevik Kremlin, to be changed into the Eurasian-Soviet one so dear to it. The destruction of the personality of the Ukrainian peasant in 1933 often reached the point of cannibalism, which leaves nothing human in a person at all, except for the animal instinct of self-preservation. There is no longer any talk of national self-awareness or love for one’s own patch of land, because they disappear in an absolutely starving person, according to the memoirs of Hryhorii Bevz (who survived the Holodomor), a few days before that person first looks at their own or a neighbor’s child with the gaze of a predatory beast. And when one adds to this that the Stalinist regime in June 1933 began to feed the Ukrainian peasants a little with grain from the very harvest that the regime had taken from them down to the last grain in the winter of 1932—1933, it becomes clear that the communists, through the artificial famine, did not want to exterminate the Ukrainian village physically; they strove to exterminate it spiritually and mentally. From this, one can conclude that those several million Ukrainians starved to death were for the red Kremlin only splinters, while the felled forest for it were those who survived the Holodomor and whose consciousness underwent the transformations so desired by their executioners. As Harvard professor, Ukrainian Hryhorii Hrabovych noted, “the main task of the policy of ethnocide is the destruction of the basic signs of an ethnos (ethnic territory, language, culture, historical memory) and, finally, self-awareness.” If one adds to this that the policy of communist ethnocide of 1933 was applied to all Ukrainian peasants and Cossacks of the USSR, then the consequences for our people were catastrophic. It was precisely after the communist ethnocide that almost all of South-Eastern Ukraine (where the Holodomor, according to Vadym Skurativskyi, was especially cruel) became Russian-speaking. And things are quite bad with historical memory here, because memorial candles on the Day of Mourning at the end of November in Odesa, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk are hard to see in the windows. Even more terrible are the consequences of the ethnocide in the Kuban, where the Ukrainian language was banned by a Stalinist decree in December 1932. If before the Holodomor there were 75% Ukrainians there, then according to the last Russian census, only 6% remained in the Kuban (a relative decrease of 12.5 times!). Where did they go, if the communists sent to Siberia only two Kuban stanitsas (Poltavska and Umanska) that rose up against forced Russification? Everything is very simple — the local Ukrainians registered themselves as Russians, while changing their ancient Cossack surnames to similar-sounding Russian ones. Recently, I had the chance to talk with one such turncoat of about 70 years of age, from whom one could paint a portrait of a Zaporizhian Sich Cossack. So, that still strong, sturdy man assured me that in their stanitsa Chervonoartilska (formerly Kyivska) “khokhols never existed.” As we can see, in the Kuban, all the consequences of ethnocide are present, according to Hrabovych. Therefore, one can only envy the insight of the Italian consul in Kharkiv, Sergio Gradenigo, who predicted the consequences of the communist ethnocide back in that same 1933: “The current misfortune will lead to the colonization of Ukraine, predominantly Russian. It will change its ethnic character, and, perhaps, in the very near future, it will be impossible to speak about Ukraine, about the Ukrainian problem, since Ukraine will actually become a Russian country.” The Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine, as befits a department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, remains on the sidelines of honoring the memory of the victims of the Holodomor. I saw priests of this church at the anniversaries of this tragedy in Luhansk only in 2008. But there are also decent people among them, for whom the truth is higher than instructions from Moscow. Here is what, for example, Archpriest Mykola Zabuga wrote about the ethnocide of Ukrainians: “As bitter as the truth is, it must be admitted that in the period of 1932—1933, an attempt was made to destroy not just individual recalcitrant people, but an attempt to wipe off the face of the earth an entire culture, mentality, and a special way of life of a people who in no way agreed to part with their religious and private-property ‘prejudices’.” The time that has passed since those distant years of our national Golgotha, unfortunately, has not returned to Ukrainians their European mentality. And this was stated by the world-renowned Holodomor researcher James Mace: “That is why the study of the political causes of the Holodomor can and must play an important role in the realization by historians, politicians, and statesmen of the West not only of the past of Ukraine, but also of what is happening here today and what may happen tomorrow.” Only two domestic intellectuals have spoken so honestly about the consequences of this ethnocide in Ukraine. Ivan Dziuba noted that after 1933, the history of Ukraine went downhill. And Vadym Skurativskyi was even more sincere: “The consciously directed and flawlessly executed by Kremlin satanists Holodomor of 1932—1933 made it impossible for Ukraine to establish itself as a strong and powerful state on the European continent. Actually, this is what the treacherous action by non-ethnic Ukrainophobes was calculated for.”
In order to identify them, one must look more closely at the mental fractures that occurred as a result of the ethnocide of the Ukrainian nation in 1933. Yes, the destruction of systemic connections within the Ukrainian ethnos means the loss by our people of the “sense of a single family,” without which it is impossible to imagine a healthy, full-fledged European nation. Thus, as a result of the Holodomor, Ukrainians lost their national self-awareness and self-identification. And without this, no foreign grants will help us build a civil society, no matter how many of them are allocated by private and state structures of Western countries, or for how long. To all of them, I will recall the wise saying of one of the fathers of French nationalism, Charles Maurras: “A nation is the greatest of existing civil associations, powerful and self-sufficient. Break it, and you will strip the individual bare. He will lose everything — protection, support, assistance.” That is exactly how, alone with their problems, the absolute majority of Ukrainians in our country eke out an existence today, rejoicing at the troubles of their neighbors and colleagues. That is precisely why it was so easy and effortless to build civil societies in Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states in a matter of years, because everything was fine there with the titular nations. Having turned from free masters into collective-farm slaves as a result of the ethnocide, Ukrainians acquired all the disgusting mental traits of the latter, which bring a person closer to an animal. A slave, like a dog, listens to his master all the more, the more harshly that master treats him. That is precisely why in post-genocidal Ukraine, the political rating of Yushchenko and “Our Ukraine” deflated so quickly, and why it drops so slowly for Yanukovych and the Party of Regions. Especially in those regions where the latter have their representative power, which allows them to use administrative resources on an unlimited scale in every election, which evokes in mental slaves not resistance, but only obedience and respect for those masters of life. It is high time to recall in this regard the saying of the classic of world political science, Machiavelli: “A person who dreams only of a piece of bread (in the literal sense of the word) cannot be a full-fledged citizen and react adequately to what is happening in the state.” And how did our society react to the imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko, the conclusion of the Kharkiv agreements, and the Kivalov-Kolesnichenko Law on Languages? Would such a reaction to something similar have been possible in Poland or Lithuania, with which we spent several centuries in one state and did not differ in mentality from Lithuanians and Poles at all? It was the Holodomor that separated us from them on different sides of the spiritual border between Europe and Eurasia. It is no coincidence that no one and nothing can overcome total corruption in Ukraine. And hopes that as soon as we have our own Saakashvili, corruption will be overcome, are in vain here. It will not be, because corruption in Georgia and Ukraine has a different nature. While the former resort-mandarin republic was simply a little spoiled by Soviet power, starting from Stalin's times, with Ukraine everything is much more complicated. The Holodomor-ethnocide mentally shattered the Ukrainian nation into separate families. As a result of this, we lack a sense of national solidarity. That is precisely why Ukrainians easily gave, give, and will give bribes for their illegal benefits, positions, places, and privileges, without thinking at all about how many of their fellow citizens will not receive them legally as a result. The attraction of Ukrainians to any positions of power is also not accidental and is insurmountable. It is caused by an intuitive post-genocidal need to guarantee their presence on the side of the executors, and not the victims, during the next state execution, like in 1933. Yes, making up only 20% of the population of the former USSR, Ukrainians at the time of its collapse accounted for 66% of the ensigns, senior non-commissioned officers, and sergeants of the Soviet Army and 31% of the union militia. The land reform itself reached a dead end in Ukraine not only as a result of inept legislation and power intrigues. Today, our peasants have the opportunity to work on their land plots and live off this. This is not happening at all because elderly people predominate in the Ukrainian village, if only because almost all of them have able-bodied children in our cities. A more plausible version is that of Holodomor researcher Hanna Horyn: “The continuity of generational experience was cruelly and forever severed. Ancient economic cultural orientations were lost, which led to the loss of cultural succession. The Soviet system, by killing in the Ukrainian peasant a conscious, strong-willed master of his land, systematically raised a generation of uninitiative, thoughtless people who are satisfied with a slave-like existence. The crisis and terror against the peasant gave birth to a crisis of the person, the owner, the master.” This is how the post-genocidal Ukrainian peasant differs fundamentally not only from the Polish peasant but also from the traditionally Ukrainian one. Therefore, recipes for Polish reforms or traditional foreign grants are unlikely to be able to pull Ukraine out of the post-genocidal quagmire. Our history is just too exclusive, unlike the countries of Central Europe or the Baltics. Therefore, our path to a legal democratic future must also be different. But that is a topic for a separate conversation.
«Слово Просвіти», CC BY 4.0; machine translation from Ukrainian by Prosvita.Digital · PDF у Вікісховищі ↗ · Машинний переклад
