Емблема «Просвіта»Prosvita.DigitalKnowledge · People · Future
Page · p. 5original page ↗

A desperate attempt to liberate Ukraine from the Moscow tsar 310 years ago, in February 1711, the military campaign of Hetman Pylyp Orlyk to Right-Bank Ukraine began for the purpose of liberating it from the troops of the Moscow tsar Peter I

Слово Просвіти, №07 за 2021 рік

The first wave of political emigration The defeat of Hetman Ivan Mazepa and the Swedish King Charles XII in the Battle of Poltava in 1709, which is called the “Poltava catastrophe” in national historiography, the punitive expedition of Moscow troops to Ukraine and the destruction of the Zaporizhian Sich radically changed the balance of power. The Tsardom of Moscow is transforming into the Russian Empire, and the Hetmanate falls under the influence of the Moscow tsar Peter I. The Swedes and five thousand Cossack allies were forced to emigrate to the city of Bender in the territory of Moldavia, which was subject to the Ottoman Empire (now Transnistria). Together with King Charles XII and Hetman Ivan Mazepa, General Scribe Pylyp Orlyk, Mazepa’s nephew Andrii Voinarovskyi, General Quartermaster Ivan Lomykovskyi, 500 Cossacks from the Hetmanate and more than 4 thousand Zaporozhians led by the Kosh Otaman of the Zaporizhian Sich Kost Hordiienko ended up in Bender. 50 members of the starshyna (officers) fell into the first wave of political emigration, among them – representatives of the Cossack starshyna families of the Poltava region: the Myrovych families (in particular, General Bunchuzhnyi Fedir Myrovych) and the Horlenko families; General Osavul Hryhorii Hertsyk, Atanas, Ivan and Hanna – children of the Poltava Colonel Pavlo Hertsyk. Hanna became the wife of Pylyp Orlyk, shared with him all the difficulties of life in emigration, and was a reliable assistant in political affairs. According to Pylyp Orlyk, they all helped in the development of the “Pacts and Constitutions of Rights and Freedoms of the Zaporizhian Host” – a document that went down in history as the first Constitution of Ukraine in 1710. The Swedish King Charles XII, even after the defeat at Poltava, did not intend to abandon the struggle in Eastern Europe. He conceived a new operation that was to secure Ukraine for the legally elected in emigration after the death of Mazepa Hetman Pylyp Orlyk. Therefore, the latter concluded an alliance with the Crimean Tatars and the Ottoman Empire, which declared war on Muscovy on November 8, 1710. The created alliance included Zaporozhians, Swedes and Tatars. On January 23, 1711, the Kair Treaty on a defensive-offensive military alliance was signed between the emigration government of Pylyp Orlyk and the Crimean Khanate. Pylyp Orlyk showed himself to be an outstanding diplomat. The school that he went through in his youth while serving under Hetman Mazepa, in particular in the position of general scribe, played a great role. A significant diplomatic merit of Orlyk was that he managed to oblige the Tatars not to take jasyr – captives, not to rob churches and not to commit violence upon entering Ukrainian territory. Pylyp Orlyk’s son, Hryhorii, remained as a hostage – a guarantor of the fulfillment of the Kair Treaty in the capital of Crimea, Bakhchisarai. The Swedish king undertook to wage war until Ukraine was liberated from Moscow rule, and the Turks and Tatars promised their help in this struggle. Letters-universals of Pylyp Orlyk Pylyp Orlyk prepared very well for the campaign. Thanks to the Constitution, which long before the classic American one proclaimed the priority of democratic principles, he received great support among the Cossacks. He also sent out letters-universals in which he called on the people to revolt against the power of the Moscow tsar. And he also sent a letter with a call to fight to the Hetman of the Left Bank Ivan Skoropadskyi, which greatly frightened the Moscow government and Tsar Peter I. “Muscovy was going through far from the best times in 1710-11. The long war with the Swedes, although it ended in the tsar’s victory, still took its toll on him. The poor material situation of the population, the lack of finances, the dissatisfaction of the foreign officers, of whom there were many in Peter’s army; the high cost of living, especially for meat and other livestock products due to an epidemic among cattle – all this greatly complicated the tsar’s position in case of war. In Ukraine, it was even worse… Right-Bank Ukraine was occupied by Moscow troops, who treated the population as they pleased. Thus, on December 10, N.S., 1710, the Prussian resident in Poland, Lelgefel, writes to his king that the Muscovites are committing terrible outrages in Podillia: they take grain and hay, not leaving the peasant a crumb for sustenance; death by starvation threatens both people and livestock because of this. It is quite understandable that such management was very painful for both the common people and the Cossacks. And it again began to place its hopes on the Zaporozhians and Orlyk. When Orlyk’s universals with a call to fight against the Muscovites began to spread throughout Right-Bank Ukraine, they found already completely prepared ground for themselves,” note the authors of the scientific internet portal “The Name of Ivan Mazepa”. On February 11, 1711, Pylyp Orlyk began the main part of the operation, and the army set out from Bender. The Tatar part of the combined army consisted of the Budjak and Bilhorod hordes, led by the son of the Crimean Khan – Sultan Galga. The Poles (supporters of Stanisław Leszczyński) fought under the command of Kyiv Voivode Józef Potocki and Starosta Galecki. The Zaporizhzhian Cossacks marched under the leadership of Kosh Otaman Kost Hordiienko. Together, the Poles and Zaporizhians had 6–7 thousand men. The army also included a small number of Swedes (about 30 officers). The commander-in-chief was Pylyp Orlyk. Having relatively insignificant forces of his own, he had to rely mainly on the Tatars. “The Turks, as one might think, gave the operation in Ukraine secondary importance and did not provide their own troops, preparing for the main clash with the Muscovites. The Tatars, as is known, were never characterized by steadfastness; being good cavalrymen, they were capable of raids and maneuver warfare, but not for the gradual, systematic occupation of territory,” stated Borys Krupnytskyi in the journal “Za Derzhavnist” (No. 4, 1934), a researcher of the history of Ukraine of the 17th – early 18th centuries, in particular Ukrainian-Swedish relations, editor of the historical department of the “Encyclopedia of Ukrainian Studies”, professor at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich, founder of the Theological-Pedagogical Academy of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and author of 140 scientific and popular science studies. Swedish King Charles XII accompanied the army for some time but soon returned to Bender. Near Rashkiv, the army crossed into the territory of Right-Bank Ukraine and quickly began to move forward. In the first half of February 1711, it was stationed in a wide area between Nemyriv, Bratslav, and Vinnytsia. Initially, the situation was favorable for Pylyp Orlyk. Society and almost all Right-Bank Cossack regiments joined the ranks of his army. An important factor in such support from the population was not only dissatisfaction with Muscovite rule but also the fact that the army now did not allow abuse and looting. This was, undoubtedly, to the credit of the hetman himself. Orlyk stood guard over law and order, understanding that the success of the planned operation depended primarily on this. There was no resistance from Muscovite forces: General Volkonsky and General Vidman, who was subordinate to him, stationed on the borders of Moldavia, retreated without a fight. An army under the command of the pro-Muscovite Cossack osaul Hryhorii Butovych moved against Orlyk’s regiments, but it was defeated in the battle near Lysianka, and the osaul himself was taken prisoner. The victory at Lysianka had a significant resonance. Ukrainian cities, including the regimental ones – Bohuslav and Korsun – surrendered without a fight. The road to Bila Tserkva became free. Betrayal of allies However, problems with provisions began, so requisitions from the population intensified. As a result of these difficulties, discipline wavered – not only the Tatars but also the Poles committed violence against the civilian population. The siege of Bila Tserkva on March 25–27 did not bring success. “Twice, on the second and third day of the siege, the Cossacks tried to attack the castle itself, having fortified themselves in the lower town and dug trenches, but they had no success. It became clear that without sufficient and appropriate caliber artillery, the castle could not be taken by storm,” explains Borys Krupnytskyi in his monograph “Pylyp Orlyk on Right-Bank Ukraine in 1711”. Seeing no progress in the storming of the fortress, the Tatar army broke camp and, spreading its detachments almost to the Dnieper, moved south to the Buh, taking captives and destroying settlements. The betrayal of the Tatars had catastrophic consequences for the entire campaign: the Right-Bank Cossacks who had joined Orlyk, hearing that the Tatars were plundering villages and towns and taking people captive, rushed to save their loved ones. As a result of the catastrophic reduction of the army, it was necessary to stop the siege of Bila Tserkva and withdraw the remnants of the troops to Fastiv. From there, the Poles set off in the direction of Polissia, and Pylyp Orlyk with the remnants of the army (3 thousand) retreated to Bender, from where the campaign had begun. The failure of the campaign had dire consequences for Orlyk himself and for the Ukrainian-Swedish orientation that he was implementing. The hetman’s reputation among the population of Ukraine suffered greatly due to the actions of the Tatars. In the spring of 1711, the Muscovite army led by Borys Sheremetiev headed to the interfluve of the Dniester and Prut, starting the Prut campaign. Pylyp Orlyk and the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks were still fighting against Muscovy in the Prut campaign in the summer of that year. However, this could no longer change the mood of the population of the Right Bank, Left Bank, and Sloboda Ukraine. Today the enemy is the same as in the times of Pylyp Orlyk This lost battle did not mean the loss of the idea of state independence. During the era of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921, Cossack traditions were revived. They became the basis for the development of the armed forces of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR), the leadership of which relied on the military-Cossack customs of their glorious predecessors. This can be traced in the names of military formations in honor of Ivan Mazepa and Kost Hordiienko, as well as in the uniforms and appearance of the soldiers of the UNR Army, the “Mazepynka” cap, hats with colored tassels, and other elements of ancient Ukrainian military clothing. Often, the fighters of the UNR Army, following the example of the Cossacks, shaved their heads, leaving only an oseledets (forelock). The historical successor of the Hetmanate of the 17th–18th centuries and the UNR is modern Ukraine, which restored its statehood 30 years ago – on August 24, 1991 – and which is forced even now, during the Russian-Ukrainian war, to defend its independence against the same age-old enemy as the Cossacks of Hetman Pylyp Orlyk. Oleh PUSTOVHAR, regional representative of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory in Poltava Oblast (based on materials from the Research Center for Humanitarian Problems of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the scientific portal “The Name of Ivan Mazepa”)

«Слово Просвіти», CC BY 4.0; machine translation from Ukrainian by Prosvita.Digital · PDF on Wikimedia Commons ↗ · Machine translation

Емблема «Просвіта»Prosvitianyn