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PR battles without rules By preserving the information space of the USSR, Russia annexed Crimea

Слово Просвіти, №12 за 2014 рік

It is about the fact that the current Ukrainian-Russian confrontation in Crimea is also a consequence of Ukraine's loss to Russia in the information field, which went unnoticed and did not alarm domestic society at all in the early 90s of the last century. In other words: having proclaimed Independence, we left the citizens of Ukraine in the Soviet agitation and propaganda space, which the Russian Federation greedily and easily transformed according to its eternal offensive great-power doctrines and plans (the Kremlin project "Russian World" undoubtedly has the most metastases from them — a large-scale intention to revive the Soviet empire in the form of a Eurasian Russia. Moreover, we are being called to return to the times of the Mongol-Tatar yoke of the Golden Horde: to slavery, the destruction of everything human in people, and national oppression). Today it sounds paradoxical, but neither the leaders of the state nor the leading experts of the defense industry — no one took into account the changes in the nature of modern warfare over two decades of Independence. And yet there were (and are!) quite solid programs of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, and there was the participation of our military in international peacekeeping forces. Finally, scientists who study the problems of the military sphere did not sit idly by either. The conclusion is sad: after 1991, the leaders of the nation drowned in inter-party (or more precisely, inter-clan) struggles for power, for the establishment of oligarchic dominance in the life of Ukraine. As a result, the legacy of the former Soviet army (armaments, training grounds, military educational institutions, a powerful air defense system (the western direction was under the tireless constant control of USSR leaders)) was totally plundered. Suffice it to say that even the Black Sea Fleet, which, according to the agreements between L. Kravchuk and B. Yeltsin (each republic was declared the owner of everything that was on its territory), went to Ukraine, was eventually divided (and today the Moscow occupiers are seizing part of the ships belonging to the Naval Forces of Ukraine). The Ukrainian government was far from understanding all these years that the wars of the third millennium are absolutely unlike past military conflicts. The US Army, the Israeli military, Iranian, Chinese armed forces, and those of NATO countries today use cyber weapons, electromagnetic types of weapons, etc., in military operations. Russia declares that it is completing the formation of its cyber troops and bringing them to a level of full combat readiness, which is provided for by the national security strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020. The technological revolution has led to the emergence of information weapons, the main task of which is primarily the disinformation of the enemy and psychological pressure on them. The priority goal of using the mentioned means is control over the information space of the antipode country. With the arrival of V. Putin to the Kremlin, the media became an effective weapon of his team in conquering lebensraum — living space for the gluttonous northern neighbor (the German-language term is used here not by chance: who now doubts that for V. Putin, as a politician, the notorious duo "Stalin-Hitler" became a model and example for blind imitation). But if we pray for the Armed Forces today, the information space of Ukraine remains outside of public attention. And what is completely incomprehensible — even that of the authorities, on whose decisions everything currently depends. This is confirmed by the latest government appointments (supported by parliament) and personnel decisions (or conversely — inaction) in the information sector of Ukraine. Vitalii ABLITSOV “It is not the right time... Let us wait a little longer... Moscow will not understand us...” In our conviction, it was precisely at the turn of the millennium that Ukraine had a chance to master its domestic information space (at the very least, to make radical changes in its development). But over time, it became clear that even a patriot president, captivated by yet another petty squabble — a conflict with yesterday’s allies in the struggle for government seats, was unable to go beyond the boundaries outlined by his predecessors. The period of President L. Kravchuk in 1991 saw a transitional period in the development of Ukrainian mass media: yesterday’s Soviet newspapers, television, and radio had to be transformed into a mouthpiece for the propaganda of state-building ideology and the protection of Ukraine’s national interests. Despite the fact that L. Kravchuk was responsible for the ideological sector in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, he did not get around to reforming the mass media. Cosmetic measures affected only organizational and partially personnel changes. L. Kuchma was also not interested in the state of domestic mass media. Like L. Kravchuk, he remembered about television before the next election campaigns. But among his like-minded people were active supporters of the commercialization of television, radio, and printed publications. Lacking sufficient funds, the newly minted owners of commercial television and radio channels, with the assistance of patrons “at the top,” used state technical resources, practically without paying for the services provided to the RRT Concern (an enterprise that ensures the distribution of television and radio signals in Ukraine). But Moscow played the most active role in the information war (it was already being waged then, but the authorities indifferently watched its events and consequences) for the Ukrainian information space. It is enough to recall that among the founders of the openly pro-Russian television channel “Inter” were not only the leadership of the Russian television channel ORT, but also army structures. With the participation of foreign capital, the television channels “1+1”, “Novyi”, STB, and others were born and entered the domestic information space. It is clear that this was facilitated by the fact that in those years of L. Kuchma’s presidency, oligarchs became the primary figures in the entourage of the state’s leaders. Their “business successes” were based not on the modernization of industry or the agricultural sector (the national economic complex as a whole), and not on the introduction of the latest technologies, investing in new production facilities, or increasing the labor market. The fate of Ukraine did not interest the “fat cats.” The tactics of the oligarchs were primitively pragmatic: they needed mass media for election campaigns, for promoting “their deputies” to the Verkhovna Rada. And then everything was as expected: “politicians” dependent on the owners of bags of dollars grouped into a parliamentary majority, and in this way, the oligarchs received direct access to the state budget, which they used not for the development of national business and the flourishing of Ukraine; it was a source of exorbitant personal enrichment for members of several clans (later the clans were pushed aside by one Donetsk family). Thus, the Ukrainian people began to work not for the benefit of Ukraine, not for the growth of general well-being, but for the enrichment of a thousand “chosen” families. As a result, the national information space, like all of Ukraine, was divided among the oligarchs, and state television and radio, whose programs largely fulfill their purpose of being a source of public information, were assigned a modest place in the broadcast (commercial channels now have almost one hundred percent coverage of the distribution of their programs on the territory of Ukraine, while the national television channel does not (?!). Being masters in parliament and the government, the oligarchs formed legislation regarding domestic mass media that corresponded to their consumerist-egoistic interests. The advertising market defeated the information market. Profits went not to the development of the national information industry, but to the enrichment of the new “masters of Ukraine.” Today, there are practically no independent mass media in our country. Russian-language television and radio companies dominate the airwaves, and kiosks in central and south-eastern Ukraine offer exclusively non-Ukrainian-language newspapers and magazines. The citizens of our state live in a foreign — foreign-language information environment, and are under the total influence of an ideology, cultural traditions, and morality that are alien to our people. What kind of education in patriotism or spiritual improvement of society can we talk about? An opponent will say: “The consumer dictates to the market.” Perhaps L. Kuchma and his like-minded people knew well what that consumer needed. But they knew even more about Kremlin sentiments and the Moscow dictate. And therefore, when I. Drach (in 2000—2002) and his like-minded people tried to take decisive steps regarding subordinating the information space to the interests of Ukraine, L. Kuchma began to react to most of the initiatives of the State Committee for Information Policy, Television and Radio of Ukraine with those phrases mentioned in the subtitle. As if to say, let us not irritate the Kremlin... “Izvestiya v Ukraine” was registered by a Kharkiv collective farm, and “Komsomolskaya pravda v Ukraine” officially declared its release in a Ukrainian-language version as well. The first step of I. Drach and his circle was an attempt to carry out the re-registration of both print and electronic media. Not with the goal of closing overtly pro-Moscow newspapers and television and radio channels — one must compete for a reader or listener-viewer with a high-quality television, radio, or print product. But “guests” must fulfill the requirements of current legislation and pay taxes for their presence (obtaining profits) in Ukraine. It was necessary to bring elementary order to the national information space, which many had previously considered a thoroughfare, a field where one could harvest several crops a year. During the examination of registration documents, it turned out that the well-known Moscow newspaper “Izvestiya” was registered at the request of the board of one of the Kharkiv collective farms (?!). The editorial office of “Komsomolskaya pravda” promised during registration to be released in a bilingual version, but remained Russian-language thereafter. And such was the distorted general picture. But Moscow was solving not only ideological tasks in Ukraine. Financial ones too. Is our information space profitable? Undoubtedly. The example of the Kharkiv entrepreneur B. Lozhkin is proof of this — today he is among the wealthiest citizens of Ukraine (70th on the list of a hundred billionaires and millionaires). Russian press publications registered in violation of current legislation brought (and continue to bring!) their owners considerable profits. Thus, the struggle for Ukraine (or more precisely, its destruction) was and is being waged not only in the military sense, but also in the economic one. That is why official Moscow did not delay its response. “Ukraine is closing Russian newspapers” — Kyiv and Moscow publications were covered with similar headlines. But we continued our work. In the action program of the State Committee for Information, we created new all-Ukrainian print publications, returned the media to the legal field of Ukraine, stopped the illegal import (smuggling) of Russian newspapers and magazines into the territory of our state, and changed current legislation to strengthen the positions and development of domestic print publications and radio and television. Only a few months after the day I. Drach was appointed head of the State Committee for Information, on July 19, the State Duma of the Russian Federation adopted a Resolution “in connection with the discrimination of the Russian language in Ukraine.” The Resolution concluded with a call to President Putin to initiate the taking of appropriate measures regarding the violation by the Ukrainian authorities of the partnership between the countries in the humanitarian sphere (?!). The Moscow pressure was so powerful that more than 60 (or even 70) publications per month were devoted to the activities of the State Committee for Information. Only the structures overseen at that time by Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Issues Yu. Tymoshenko were under similar fire. The State Committee for Information was attacked not only by Moscow publications, but also by Russian-language ones published in Ukraine. It is interesting that the “heroes” of the all-encompassing offensive on the Ukrainian information space are still, as they say, “on the job” today. Active participants in the TV program “Svoboda slova” on ICTV (host A. Kulykov) remain to this day Ya. Sokolovska (“Izvestiya v Ukraine”), O. Musafirova (“Novaya gazeta”), and other fighters for a “Russian Ukraine” (in their understanding — Malorossiya). President L. Kuchma and his circle stopped any attempts to strengthen the positions of Ukrainian print publications and electronic media. Instead, various commercial television and radio channels flourished like thistles on a dump. Most of them still exist today, feeding consumers with ersatz — low-quality

«Слово Просвіти», CC BY 4.0; machine translation from Ukrainian by Prosvita.Digital · PDF on Wikimedia Commons ↗ · Machine translation

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