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Russia's aggression: genesis, goal, methods of counteraction and legal consequences

Слово Просвіти, №12 за 2014 рік

Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine, which began on February 27, 2014, with the forceful seizure of the building of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, was accompanied by the occupation of the peninsula by Russian armed regular and irregular formations. Volodymyr VASYLENKO, international legal scholar, Honored Lawyer of Ukraine, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine, Doctor of Law, Professor. On March 16, 2014, under conditions of military occupation, an illegitimate pseudo-referendum on the entry of the Crimean autonomy into the Russian Federation took place there; on March 17, the Verkhovna Rada of the ARC, dissolved by a resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, proclaimed Crimea an independent state, and on March 18, its self-proclaimed representatives signed a treaty with the President of the RF Vladimir Putin on its inclusion into Russia. In other words, an illegal and hasty deal took place, intended to create an appearance of legitimacy for Russia's forceful detachment of a part of Ukraine's territory. Genesis. The immediate factors that provoked Russia's armed aggression and its annexation of a part of Ukraine's territory were the weakness of the national security sector and the overly tolerant attitude of leading Western states toward the revanchist neo-imperialist policy of the RF in the post-Soviet space. The criminal and prolonged underfunding of the Ukrainian Armed Forces during the presidencies of Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Yushchenko ended in the destruction of the entire national security sector under the Yanukovych regime. The actions of the team led by him, which not only robbed the country but also destroyed its defense capability, should be viewed as high treason. The degradation of the army and navy, foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, the Security Service, and the NSDC took place not without the participation of Russian special services and agents of influence, who were widely infiltrated into state administration structures at all levels and acted unhindered and with impunity. Starting the planned aggression against Ukraine, the leadership of Russia knew perfectly well about the unsatisfactory state of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and other components of national security. However, the aggression against Ukraine also became a consequence of the complete helplessness of Western democracies in countering the expansionist policy of the RF, which was most clearly manifested during its aggression against Georgia. Russia's impunity for its criminal actions in August 2008 gave birth to a new crime — the aggression against Ukraine in March 2014. A Russian invasion would not have occurred in either Georgia or Ukraine if both states had been members of NATO or at least had a Membership Action Plan (MAP) for the Alliance. It seemed that they were supposed to receive it in April 2008 at the NATO Bucharest Summit. However, as a result of the position of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President François Mitterrand, and Icelandic Prime Minister Geir Haarde, this did not happen. To block Ukraine's and Georgia's path to membership in the Alliance, Russia mobilized the entire arsenal of its diplomacy and special services and succeeded. Speaking on January 29, 2009, in Moscow at an expanded meeting of Federal Security Service personnel, RF President Dmitry Medvedev said: “In a number of neighboring states, an unstable socio-political situation persists, and attempts to expand NATO have not ceased, including through the so-called accelerated accession of Georgia and Ukraine to the Alliance. All this, quite understandably, required clear and coordinated work of all special security structures, law enforcement agencies, and a very high level of coordination of their activities. I must say right away that the Federal Security Service has generally successfully fulfilled the tasks set before it.” The deep-seated reason for both the irresponsibility of the Ukrainian authorities in guaranteeing the country's security and the helplessness of the West in countering Russian expansion lies in the ignoring of the driving motives of the RF's Ukrainian policy, and therefore in the inability to adequately assess its geopolitical goals and the strategy regarding Ukraine conditioned by them. In the history of Russia, Ukraine has played a special role, therefore its independent existence is a challenge to the Russian imperial consciousness and psychologically traumatizes modern Russian imperial chauvinists. For a certain time in the past, it was a powerful spiritual, cultural, and resource donor and, at the same time, the engine of the transformation of the Tsardom of Muscovy into an empire. After the annexation of its territory, it expanded its borders to the frontiers of Eastern Europe, and subsequently proclaimed itself an empire, adapted for itself the name of the ancient Ukrainian state — Rus — and appropriated the entire history of Ukraine-Rus before the Mongol-Tatar invasion. The revival of Ukraine's independent statehood is inevitably connected with the restoration of its national memory and distinct national history, makes Russia's history truncated, and destroys the myth of a thousand-year statehood and the latter's primordial belonging to the European civilizational space. Russian imperial chauvinists understand that without Ukraine (with its territory, resources, and human potential), any attempts by Russia to restore its imperial status are futile. As a result, the local political elite and the majority of citizens believe that: — Ukraine is part of Russia and should not exist separately from it; — Ukraine is to blame for the disintegration of the Soviet empire and the troubles in Russia caused by this; — Russians and Ukrainians are one people, their reunification in one state must end with the formation of a powerful super-ethnos and the creation of a “Russian World” with one church, one language, and one culture; — the independent statehood of Ukraine is a geopolitical anomaly and poses a strategic threat to Russia; — Russia without Ukraine is geopolitically incomplete and cannot be reborn as a global superpower. Anti-Ukrainian ideologemes and revanchist aspirations rooted in the Russian mentality determine the content of the Russian Federation’s Ukrainian foreign policy, the ultimate strategic goal of which involves the total destruction of Ukraine as a geopolitical reality, a national unit, and a subject of international law. Accordingly, behind the facade of relations characteristic of civilized relations between sovereign states, Russia is carrying out a special operation against Ukraine, in which three key imperatives dominate: 1) countering Ukraine’s integration policy in the Western direction, since its membership in NATO and the EU makes the very idea of reviving a Russian (under the guise of a Eurasian) neo-empire impossible; 2) eradicating everything Ukrainian within and outside the borders of Russia, since only the destruction of Ukrainian identity can become a prerequisite for the creation and a guarantee of the existence of such an empire; 3) constantly maintaining a state of controlled chaos in Ukraine and provoking separatist movements aimed at weakening state institutions, dismembering the country, and ruining its statehood. The realization of these imperatives takes place in close cooperation between Russian diplomacy and special services using Soviet traditions. The main methods in their arsenal are the subversive activities of agents and agents of influence, disinformation and blackmail, threats and pressure, bribery, and the involvement of criminal elements in special operations. An important factor influencing the content, methods, and ways of implementing Russia’s Ukrainian policy is the personality of Vladimir Putin, who has a Chekist past, claims the role of a lifelong “national leader,” and demonstrates paranoid hatred and contempt for Ukrainians and Ukraine. It is no coincidence that with his election to the presidency in 2000, Russia’s Ukrainian policy became more brutal and insidious, larger in scale, and more systematic. In addition to countering Ukraine’s course toward European and Euro-Atlantic integration, the Russian Federation embarked on a path of expanding humanitarian aggression, carried out with the help of agents and a fifth column in the informational, linguistic, cultural, historical, and confessional spheres. Thus, Russia seeks to destroy the identity of Ukrainians, which is a system-forming component of the Ukrainian national state, and to ensure a “final solution to the Ukrainian question” in the context of traditional Russian imperial aspirations. The Ukrainian government controlled by the Kremlin, headed by Viktor Yanukovych, extended the term of the stay of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Crimea, abandoned the course toward European and Euro-Atlantic integration, and acted as an accomplice to Russian humanitarian aggression against Ukraine. The collapse of the Yanukovych regime and his removal from power meant that the new Ukrainian government would restore the course toward European and Euro-Atlantic integration, counter Russian humanitarian expansion aimed at ruining Ukraine’s statehood through the destruction of its national identity, and take measures to restore law and order, strengthen democratic state institutions, and preserve the unity of the country. Having felt the loss of control over Ukraine, Putin resorted to armed aggression, the result of which was the detachment of Crimea from Ukraine. This was revenge against Ukrainians for the Maidan and, at the same time, a large-scale special operation aimed at subjugating Ukraine once and for all. Russia’s aggressive action in Crimea critically deepens the conflict component of Ukrainian-Russian relations and has a more far-reaching goal than depriving Ukraine of part of its territory. Confirmation of this is the attempt by Russian diplomacy to propose a plan for settling the Ukrainian-Russian conflict that is destructive to the statehood and unity of Ukraine and to involve Western states in its implementation. On March 5, 2014, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov, during negotiations with US Secretary of State John Kerry, outlined its main elements, namely: Ukraine’s non-signing of the Association Agreement with the EU, refusal to join NATO, moving the date of the presidential election from May 25, 2014, to a later date, the development of a new Constitution, the federalization of Ukraine, and granting the Russian language the status of a second state language. In a more expanded and slightly modified form, Lavrov’s plan was set out in a statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry regarding a Support Group for Ukraine, published on December 17, 2013. In its content and direction, this is a plan not for settlement, but for deepening the conflict, since it deprives Ukraine of the right to participate in the Euro-Atlantic security system, leaves it alone with Russia, and creates grounds for its interference in internal Ukrainian affairs. Lavrov’s plan is a program for the international isolation of Ukraine, fragmentation and division, Russification, and the destruction of the identity of the Ukrainian nation, and therefore the liquidation of its statehood. This program provides for the postponement of the presidential election — obviously, the Kremlin has not yet found a puppet similar to Yanukovych to whom its implementation can be entrusted. One would like to believe that this plan will be rejected by both the Ukrainian government and Western democracies. It should be understood that the forceful detachment of Crimea from Ukraine will not satisfy Russia’s appetites, but will encourage the Kremlin dictator to further expansionist actions aimed not only at the fragmentation of Ukraine and the ruin of its statehood, but also against other countries. Evidence of this is the concentration of Russian troops on the eastern borders of Ukraine and rallies under separatist slogans, which Russian special services are trying to organize in regional centers of certain eastern regions with the help of political provocateurs brought there from Russia. Vladimir Putin, speaking in the Kremlin on March 18, 2014, stated that there are “significant territories of the South of Russia” within Ukraine. Therefore, it can be predicted that the Russian Federation will soon make an attempt to detach them as well. It is also not excluded that at a certain time, Russian agents may be used to create chaos and put forward unlawful demands in European countries where Russian or Russian-speaking “compatriots” are present, under the pretext of protecting their rights. Ways of countering In this situation, the Ukrainian authorities must demonstrate determination in neutralizing and punishing those guilty of encroaching on the territorial integrity of Ukraine and inciting separatism. At the same time, Acting President of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchynov must publicly announce an order to the Armed Forces of Ukraine to use weapons in the event of any attempts to expand Russia's aggression beyond the borders of the Crimean Peninsula. As a state that has suffered an armed attack, Ukraine has the right to individual and collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. This means that individual and collective sanctions of a military, political, diplomatic, and economic nature can and must be applied against Russia as an aggressor state. The primary role in countering Russian aggression must be played by Ukraine itself. Only then can one hope for the assistance of other states and international organizations. Unfortunately, given the lack of determination and political will among the new leadership of Ukraine and the perfidy of Russia's actions, the security structures of Ukraine have failed to quickly neutralize the puppet leaders of the Crimean separatists and suppress the aggression.

«Слово Просвіти», CC BY 4.0; machine translation from Ukrainian by Prosvita.Digital · PDF en Wikimedia Commons ↗ · Traducción automática

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