Емблема «Просвіта»ПРОСВІТАЦИФРОВАЗнання · Люди · Майбутнє

THE MOSCOW FOUNDATION OF THE UKRAINIAN POLITICAL DRAMA

Слово Просвіти, №41 за 2005 рік

VIEW It is interesting that, as sociologists assure, the trust rating in mass media has increased significantly (+20%), which had not happened in the past. Obviously, this should be attributed to the President’s consistent policy aimed at establishing real freedom of speech. There is no shortage of sociological forecasts regarding the possible results of the vote for the future parliament. Thus, 20.9% of those polled by the “Ukrainian Barometer” sociological service are ready to vote for the “People’s Union ‘Our Ukraine’” party if the party list is headed by Viktor Yushchenko. The Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc of parties is in third place with a result of 16.8% after the Party of Regions led by Viktor Yanukovych, for which 19.8% of those polled are ready to vote. Communists and socialists will be able to garner 6.8% and 6.7% respectively, and the newly created Volodymyr Lytvyn bloc — 5.1% of the vote. One should treat the results of sociological research in Ukraine quite cautiously: it is possible to compose a questionnaire in such a way as to lead respondents to an answer desired by certain forces — unfortunately, such scandalous cases have been recorded in the past. But despite this, both the current results and the facts from real life reflect those public sentiments and that level of public consciousness that truly prevail in society. Everything boils down to the following trends: 1) bitter disappointment that the ideals and hopes of the Maidan did not come true — in full and immediately; 2) the split in the orange camp caused damage to both blocs, and in the next elections neither of them will be able to obtain a decisive advantage, and the Verkhovna Rada will again be “colorful” in a political sense, which may turn it into a discussion club similar to the current one. 3) this split affected not only the Yushchenko and Tymoshenko blocs, but also their closest allies and the electorate in general. The split in the political sphere can be traced by the example of two parties — the Ukrainian Republican “Sobor” and “Reforms and Order” (PRP). The parliamentary group of the former, which is part of the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc faction, went against the party program line: by not voting for the candidacy for the post of Prime Minister Yekhanurov, it ended up in the same camp as the communists and the SDPU(o). Party leader Anatoliy Matviyenko assessed this position as one that does not act in the interest of Ukrainian interests and is a betrayal of them. The deputies, almost all of whom are members of the party leadership, taking advantage of Matviyenko’s emotional statement that he was resigning as chairman and leaving the party in protest, hastened to satisfy it. At a meeting of the Central Council — the highest party body between congresses — they tried to remove Matviyenko from leadership, despite his withdrawal of his hasty statement. The reason is that Matviyenko is a supporter of creating a right-wing pre-election bloc together with other national-democratic parties, while the republican deputies, who dream of keeping their parliamentary mandates, prefer joining the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc as a satellite. This was clearly revealed by the debates at the Central Council meeting, and its participants by an overwhelming majority left Matviyenko in the post of chairman. But the Sobor deputies did not agree with the decision of the Central Council and launched attacks on Matviyenko in the press. Such actions bring confusion into the party ranks, and a split has already begun in regional organizations. The “Reforms and Order” party is also ready for a similar course of events: a part of its leaders supports Yushchenko, its chairman Viktor Pynzenyk accepted the offer to head the Ministry of Finance, while another part, following ex-Prime Minister Mykola Tomenko, is gravitating toward the BYuT bloc. Opinions diverged at a recent extraordinary congress, and supporters of unity with BYuT managed to include in the decision a provision on starting negotiations with Yulia Tymoshenko. However, it is not excluded that the final decision will be made by the next party congress, which will take place closer to the elections. These splits are accompanied by rhetoric calculated for pre-election agitation. Supporters of various groups, instead of presenting the positives of their bloc and their leader to the electorate, try to denigrate their former allies, and now opponents. Supporters of Yulia Tymoshenko exercise most in attacks on Yushchenko. This is explained by two reasons: 1) the old undemocratic tradition of betting on so-called compromising material — previous parliamentary and presidential races were marked by the blackening of rivals; 2) the ideology of both camps is one and the same — it is the ideology of the Orange Revolution; neither camp has proposed anything new, so they exchange accusations of retreating from the ideals of the Maidan. Of course, Viktor Yushchenko made quite a few mistakes. They consist in the fact that he initially failed to adhere to the proclaimed principles: to separate business from politics and political leaders from participation in the government. But during the crisis, he took a decisive step to correct this mistake and is trying to bring what was started to its logical conclusion. The reproaches to the President about so-called nepotism in personnel policy, about omissions in the upbringing of his eldest son, facts about whose dissolute life became, not without the efforts of the mass media, known to the general public, are also fair. One can criticize Yushchenko for signing the Law on restoring the immunity of local council deputies adopted by the Verkhovna Rada, contrary to his promise in his last interview not to sign this document. One can, if desired, find many more “mortal sins” of the President. But no one doubts that much of what was promised on the Maidan has been and is being implemented. In particular, Ukraine is becoming a democratic state with increasing confidence, the press is now truly free, it is not under pressure from central government structures, and there are no forbidden topics for journalists. Just as there is no doubt that Yushchenko seeks to correct mistakes that are inevitable in this situation and with the complex legacy inherited from the previous regime (even Kuchma, when he was going for a second term, stated that he had been learning to be president for the previous five years, although even during his second term he turned out to be just as poor a student). And if one puts the President’s mistakes and good deeds on the scales, the latter clearly prevail. After all, Yushchenko has the main thing — a Ukrainian soul, an orientation toward defending Ukrainian interests in any matter — whether it be domestic or foreign policy. Yulia Tymoshenko, unfortunately, for the sake of a mercantile desire to win the parliamentary elections in order to come to power, seems ready to sacrifice national interests. That is why she does not shy away from any means. Let’s say, her views on political reform have changed to the exact opposite. At one time, her faction was the only one in the Verkhovna Rada that did not support the draft law on reform in a package with other laws. Now, however, the ex-Prime Minister not only supports this same reform but also seeks to implement it as quickly as possible. Her views on Ukraine’s European integration have also changed. The European Union no longer attracts her, because, on JUDGMENT AND DEED The political crisis that unfolded after the sensational television appearances of former State Secretary Zinchenko, former Vice Prime Minister Tomenko, and former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko ended with the removal of the most odious representatives from the presidential entourage, the resignation of the government, and the formation of a new one. The Orange camp split in half — into supporters of the Viktor Yushchenko bloc and supporters of the Yuliya Tymoshenko bloc. The fierce information war of compromising materials that began along with this has now moved into the initial phase of the parliamentary race long before its official announcement. At the same time, the leaders of both sides lost standing in the eyes of society. The Ukrainian Barometer sociological service recorded that the level of trust in Yushchenko decreased by 8% over two weeks in September, and the balance of trust dropped to minus 5.2%; while the level of trust in the former prime minister fell by 9% during the same time (the balance of trust is minus 18%).

«Слово Просвіти», CC BY 4.0; machine translation from Ukrainian by Prosvita.Digital · PDF у Вікісховищі ↗ · Машинний переклад

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