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UNIFICATION OF UKRAINIANS AND UKRAINE: MYTH OR PROSPECT

Слово Просвіти, №46 за 2007 рік

The topic of the unification of Ukrainians and Ukraine has again begun to be actively discussed in connection with the formation of a new parliamentary coalition. Many politicians claim that in the event of the creation of an “orange” coalition, the numerous faction of the Regionals, with the active support of the communists, will not let it work productively. The unexpected and unnatural ways of creating a coalition in the Verkhovna Rada of the previous convocation, its dissolution and the course of the recent election campaign, the “war of monuments” that has begun, clashes and discussions on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the UPA and regarding the renaming of Sichnevoho Povstannia Street in Kyiv testify to the existence of sharp contradictions in Ukrainian society. Are they surmountable and does the unification of Ukrainians have a prospect? Yurii HNATKEVYCH, Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences The first contradiction stems from the unresolved nature of the national question. Having delved into history and cast an eye over the map of the world, we will see that almost all nations are building their national states: the Poles built Poland, the Japanese — Japan, the Mongols — Mongolia, the Russians — Russia, etc. The existence of a national state contributes to the formation and cohesion of a nation. For centuries, Ukrainians failed to create their own state. Not reinforced by statehood, the Ukrainian nation was not fully formed. In the USSR, Ukrainians were awaited by Russification. Therefore, when an independent Ukraine began to be built, it turned out that for a significant part of Ukrainians, only their surnames remained Ukrainian: they do not communicate in the Ukrainian language and do not respect it. If, after the declaration of Independence, the authorities had decisively set a course for Ukrainian national revival, opened Ukrainian schools everywhere, transferred the press, higher education, the military, and other security structures to the Ukrainian language, and begun to educate the youth in the spirit of national patriotism, Ukraine would be different now. Therefore, the main contradiction that is currently tearing the Ukrainian state apart and splitting its political elite lies in the national plane. Leaders of the Party of Regions talk about democracy and the rights of the “Russian-speaking population,” but avoid conversations about what methods and for what purpose their language was being poisoned out of Ukrainians for centuries. They remain silent about what will happen to Ukraine after the introduction of the state status of the Russian language. Currently, Russian dominates in most cities of Ukraine, and therefore, after the implementation of the Regionals' plan, it, as in Belarus, would very soon become the main or even the only state language. There are no nations with two languages. If a nation has two languages, then it is no longer one, but two nations. Therefore, the Party of Regions is preparing for us in the future the final division of Ukrainianness into two nations, and Ukraine — into two states. The second sharp contradiction characteristic of modern Ukraine lies in the class-social plane. Before the declaration of Independence in Ukraine, all means of production, all enterprises were state-owned. All this was called national property. However, privatization very quickly turned into the outright theft of state property. The hands of the most agile representatives of the former communist and Komsomol nomenclature reached for the national property. Privatization took place in circumvention of the law and morality. Soon, criminals, primarily from Donetsk, actively joined in the plundering of state wealth. In Ukraine, enormous capital was accumulated and concentrated in the hands of a small group of people. At the same time, millions of Ukrainians became enriched only with problems: with pensions, salaries, tariffs, debts, and lost savings. The Orange Revolution became a kind of explosion of popular anger. The last elections again return us to the ideas and slogans of this revolution. Yuliya Tymoshenko and her associates saved the Orange Revolution and are again raising the problem of additional payment for enterprises purchased for a pittance. They are talking about draft laws that should revive the power of privatization certificates, about the return of lost savings, about bringing numerous economic structures out of the shadows. The third serious contradiction in Ukrainian society stems from the different attitudes toward the colonial and communist past. It is about a different assessment of Russia's role in Ukrainian history, the Holodomor, the UPA, etc. A vivid example is the toponymic policy of the authorities. Ukraine can be started to be divided into east and west not by a linguistic criterion and not along the Dnipro, but by the presence of monuments to Lenin and streets and cities named in his honor and in honor of other Bolsheviks, military figures of the times of the criminal civil war and communist figures of different countries and periods. In the Rivne region, for example, there is no longer a single monument to the communist leader, whereas in the Kyiv region, a granite or stone Lenin looms in all district centers. In the very center of Kyiv, he also stands. In the former Cossack capital of Zaporizhzhia, there are eight toponymic objects named after Lenin: Dniprohes, a prospect, a port, a park, an island, a combine, a monument, etc., but there are no streets named in honor of Ukrainian hetmans. The city and streets in dozens of other cities were named after the executioner and professional thief Kotovsky, who shot 359 Ukrainians near the village of Bazar. “Co... Continued on p. 3 Investigative case of Mykhailo Kravchuk Father of the Ukrainian theater Voluntary donations to the “Kobzar Church”: MBF “Ukrainian Family” Current account No. 26045200145101 at the Podil branch of AKB “Kyiv”, MFO 320401 ZKPO 21709106

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Conclusion. Beginning on p. 1. The commander of a detachment of sailors, Andriy Polupanov, arrived in Ukraine together with Muravyov’s troops and, after the massacre of Kyiv students near Kruty, broke into Kyiv with his “detachment” and ordered that everyone who wore embroidered shirts, who had their hair cut in the “oseledets” style, or who spoke the Ukrainian language be shot and bayoneted. By Polupanov’s order, thousands of Kyivans were killed. One of the Kyiv streets was named after this murderer. For 16 years of Independence, the Kyiv authorities, despite the persistent demands of the public, resisted the renaming of this street. The unveiling of a monument to the Russian tsarina in Odesa, to Stepan Bandera in Lviv, the destruction by the authorities of a memorial sign in honor of Otaman Symon Petliura in Poltava, statements about intentions to install another monument to Catherine II, calls to demolish the bust of one of the organizers of the Holodomor, Chubar, in his native village, the clashes of columns of protesters on the day of the 65th anniversary of the UPA, provocations in Crimea and in Kyiv on the day of “Russian unity,” statements by the Luhansk and Donetsk regional councils regarding the awarding of the title of Hero of Ukraine to Roman Shukhevych testify that the confrontation in society regarding the attitude toward Ukraine’s colonial past truly exists. But who is provoking it — the people or the politicians? How indifferent or actively conscious is the position of certain strata of society on issues that divide it? In Ukraine, there is not enough objective sociological data regarding confrontations, in particular between the east and the west. Let us imagine that the “orange” forces came to power at the parliamentary and governmental levels and began to legislatively liquidate the symbols of communist totalitarianism along with monuments, the names of certain cities, and countless streets in cities. Experience shows that when Kommunarsk was renamed Alchevsk, Zhdanov to Mariupol, Voroshilovgrad to Luhansk, Chervonoarmiysk to Radyvyliv, when streets were renamed or old names were returned to them in Kyiv and other cities, no unrest occurred. The relevant decisions were made by local councils, and the renaming was approved by the Verkhovna Rada. It will be the same now. After all, it is not about massive and hasty campaigns, but about moving an important social problem off the ground. Let us recall how, thanks to the position of the leaders of the SDPU(o), a long-awaited decision was made to liquidate the symbols of the Ukrainian SSR on the pediments of the Verkhovna Rada. Totalitarian symbolism is not close to the Party of Regions and its supporters. Only communists and “Vitrenko supporters” will protest aggressively. But the elections showed that the people turned away from them, and that their protests will not lead to the disunity of Ukraine. If O. Omelchenko had moved the monument to communist leaders to a museum and renamed some streets, as he promised after his first election as mayor, this would have been forgotten long ago, just as people have forgotten what the capital’s streets of Sahaidachnyi, Khmelnytskyi, Oles Honchar, and Shovkovychna were called before. But the former communist O. Omelchenko for some reason changed his mind. Let us recall that Independence Square was called October Revolution Square, and even earlier — Kalinin Square. European Square was called Leninist Komsomol Square, and before that — Stalin Square. There are no special grounds to fear that if the city of Torez in Donetsk Oblast (Torez is the surname of the late leader of the French Communist Party, whom no one mentions now) were returned the name it had before 1964 — Chystiakove, the population would take to protest actions. It is also hard to believe that V. Yanukovych, whose grandfather and grandmother fled from Oryol Oblast to Donbas, escaping dekulakization and deportation to Siberia, will defend the symbolism and toponymy of communist times. V. Yanukovych will have slightly bigger problems with the state status of the Russian language. R. Bohatyrova explained the fact that their party included in its party and election programs a provision on granting the Russian language the status of a state language as follows: “Because we promised this to our voters.” But would it not have been better to promise their “voters” to create conditions for Ukrainians living in the cities of Donbas and southern Ukraine under which they could learn to communicate freely in Ukrainian? Would it not have been better to first take care of the problems of the Ukrainian language, which still feels like a servant in its own home in the Donbas and Slobozhanshchyna? The Party of Regions refers to the opinion of its “voters” without actually knowing this opinion. The circumstance that Russian chauvinism managed to a significant extent to de-Ukrainize the urban Ukrainians of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions DOES NOT MEAN that they have already moved into a different ethnic state and do not consider themselves or do not feel like Ukrainians, and in the event of the spread of the use of the Ukrainian language in educational institutions, mass media, and official activities, will organize to demand withdrawal from Ukraine. According to the data of the last population census, the majority of the population of the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine called themselves Ukrainians. Thus, in 2001, 56% of the population in Donetsk Oblast, 70.7% in Kharkiv Oblast, 70.8% in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, 79.3% in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, 62.8% in Odesa Oblast, 81.9% in Mykolaiv Oblast, and 58% in Luhansk Oblast identified themselves as Ukrainians. Only in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts is the number of citizens who identified Ukrainian as their native language small (24.1% and 30% respectively); in the other mentioned oblasts, they are the majority, and in Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts — the overwhelming majority (69.2% and 67% respectively). The population census was a kind of referendum. It was conducted precisely so that the results could be taken into account in state policy. The Ukrainian language has not become alien to Russian-speaking Ukrainians or even to Russians. In Ukraine, it is important

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